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Self-categorization as a nonmarket strategy for subsidiaries of multinationals:  





This article examines how MNE subsidiaries develop nonmarket strategies to create a fit between a 
global market strategy and a local nonmarket framework. Derived from an analysis of archives and 
interviews on eBay’s expansion into France, our findings suggest that MNE subsidiaries engage in 
defensive and proactive self-categorization to create their nonmarket strategic fit. Specifically, 
through the purposeful use of labels, rhetoric and narratives, self-categorization enables subsidiaries 
to strategically position themselves vis-à-vis both regulators and local incumbents, thereby 
exercising agency to influence the nonmarket environment in their preferred direction. The findings 
contribute to the institution-based view of international strategy by shedding new light on the 
interaction between MNE subsidiaries and local institutional authorities in a context of international 
expansion. Furthermore, we theorize how subsidiaries use self-categorization to transfer global 
organizational practices to the host country. 
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Researchers in international business (IB) have long theorized that multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) face a liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). In particular, the differences and potential 
contradictions between home and host countries’ institutions can be a sensitive issue for MNEs 
pursuing a global strategy, even more so given the diversity of norms, cognitive references and 
formal regulations across regions (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). To cope with idiosyncratic ‘rules of the 
game’ and accommodate potentially conflicting national institutions, MNEs develop nonmarket 
strategies aimed at coping with, and influencing, the institutional environment in which they operate 
(Baron, 1995; Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012). 
Nonmarket strategic fit – that is, the alignment between a firm’s business strategy and the 
institutional environment (Lux, 2016) – is particularly hard to achieve for subsidiaries of MNEs. In the 
case of domestic businesses, nonmarket strategies aim to address ‘unidimensional’ tensions 
between the firm’s market strategy and its nonmarket environment (see Wrona & Sinzig, 2018 for a 
recent literature review). Conversely, MNEs and their subsidiaries develop nonmarket strategies to 
resolve various multidimensional tensions: between host and home institutional frameworks 
(Blumentritt, 2003; Keim & Hillman, 2008); between the business strategy of the corporation and 
constraints imposed by international institutions (Boddewyn & Doh, 2011; Doh, McGuire, & Ozaki, 
2015); and between simultaneously pursuing a global market strategy and a multi-domestic 
nonmarket strategy (Kobrin, 2015; White, Boddewyn, & Galang, 2015). Caught in an “institutional 
duality” (Kostova & Roth, 2002), MNE subsidiaries rely greatly on their ability to build effective 
patterns of interaction with foreign governments at an early stage and to establish trustworthy 
relationships with them in order to facilitate the transfer of the organizational practices designed by 
their head offices (Elsahn & Benson-Rea, 2018; Kostova, 1999).  
While current studies have considerably advanced our understanding of nonmarket 
strategies in the context of international business, we still know little about how subsidiaries achieve 
a nonmarket strategic fit in the early stages of their expansion. In particular, the process through 
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which MNE subsidiaries cope with their host countries’ formal institutional frameworks while also 
pursuing their global strategy remains largely unexplored. This is an important omission, because the 
tensions between local/nonmarket and global/market conditions may lead to competitive 
disadvantages for subsidiaries, especially in an era of global connectivity that increases pressures 
towards standardization (Alcácer, Cantwell, & Piscitello, 2016; Brouthers, Geisser, & Rothlauf, 2016). 
We therefore ask the following question: How do MNE subsidiaries develop nonmarket strategies to 
create a fit between a global market strategy and a local nonmarket framework?    
We adopt an institution-based view of international strategy (Peng, 2002; Peng, Wang, & Yi, 
2008) and address the question through a longitudinal case analysis of eBay’s entry into and 
expansion in the French market. We focus on how the subsidiary negotiated its nonmarket strategic 
fit in the face of conflicting challenges stemming from the necessity to follow the global market 
strategy dictated by its US head office while also addressing the constraints arising from the local 
legal framework. We found that eBay’s nonmarket strategies relied on self-categorization – the 
definition of a firm’s activities in terms of a prototype that “describes and prescribes perceptions, 
attitudes, feelings and behaviors” (Hogg & Terry, 2000, p. 124). In the case we observed, the 
subsidiary resorted to defensive and proactive self-categorization that involved the purposeful use 
of labels, rhetoric and narratives. Labels provided classifying names for assigning the subsidiary to a 
convenient category; rhetoric expressed the subsidiary’s capacity to influence nonmarket actors 
through logical argumentation; and narratives conveyed the subsidiary’s efforts to construct 
meaning out of situational cues. Our findings contribute to the institution-based view of 
international strategy by expanding our understanding of self-categorization as a nonmarket 
strategy. In particular, we theorize how subsidiaries use self-categorization to a) create a nonmarket 




2 Internationalization, institutions and nonmarket strategies 
In recent years, the recognition that the internationalization of companies is as much an 
economic as it is a political endeavor, in which market and nonmarket strategies intertwine 
(Boddewyn, 1988; Oliver, 1991), has led to the emergence of an ‘institution-based view’ of 
international business (Peng, 2002; Peng, et al., 2008). The institution-based view “focuses on the 
dynamic interaction between institutions and organizations, and considers strategic choices as the 
outcome of such interactions” (Peng, et al., 2008, p. 922). Institutions are therefore seen as 
governing the strategic behavior of MNEs in the sense that firms make decisions within the formal 
and informal constraints of given institutional frameworks (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Peng, Sunny Li, 
Pinkham, & Hao, 2009). In particular, idiosyncratic institutions constrain their choices of locations 
(Xu & Shenkar, 2002), entry strategies (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009) and – once they have 
entered a foreign market – the adoption of organizational practices and the implementation of their 
strategic decisions (Boddewyn, 2003; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Tashman, Marano, & Kostova, 2019). 
The term ‘institutions’ refers to nonmarket constraints, ranging from the ‘informal’, which 
derive from the accepted norms and cultures that permeate economic exchanges, to ‘formal’, which 
include laws and regulations created at a national, regional or global level to regulate exchanges 
(Boddewyn, 2016; North, 1990; Peng, et al., 2009). In their post-entry phase, MNE subsidiaries have 
little leverage over informal institutions, which are generally rooted in a country’s history and 
traditions, especially in emerging or transitioning economies, where formal regulations may be 
underdeveloped (Meyer, et al., 2009; Meyer & Peng, 2005). In developed economies, formal 
institutions are particularly essential to a firm’s ability to act, as the metaphor “organizations are 
immersed in a sea of laws” (Edelman & Suchman, 1997, p. 480) implies. Unlike informal institutions, 
laws and regulations can be influenced by companies, which can build channels of communication 
with regulators and contribute towards shaping legal rules (Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 1999; 
White, et al., 2015). In this article, we focus on these formal institutions, and more specifically on the 
regulatory environments in which MNE subsidiaries operate.  
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MNEs need to engage in political behavior and develop nonmarket strategies in order to 
respond to idiosyncratic institutions (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). The argument is not new, and has 
been extensively discussed in the general context of domestic firms since Baron’s (1995) seminal 
article (see Doh, et al., 2012; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016 for reviews). Scholars have 
identified a repertoire of different strategies ranging from ‘defensive’, which aim to protect existing 
modes of market interaction by thwarting undesired regulatory changes, to ‘proactive’, which seek 
to shape the institutional environment in a favorable way by influencing how norms, standards and 
regulations are developed (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Oliver & Holzinger, 
2008; Rajwani & Liedong, 2015). Like domestic firms, MNEs develop nonmarket strategies to resolve 
conflicts between their managerial interests and the requirements imposed on them by institutions: 
that is, to create a strategic fit between their business and their nonmarket environment (Edelman, 
1992; Funk & Hirschman, 2017; Lux, 2016). 
In the case of MNEs, however, this fit involves additional dimensions when compared with 
purely domestic firms. MNEs have to deal with markets that are “increasingly characterized by flows, 
networks and multiscalarity” and at the same time, with institutional environments that are “still 
largely geographically delimited… at a national or even a local scale” (Kobrin, 2015, p. 263). The 
consequence of this discrepancy is that MNEs need to simultaneously address highly integrated 
markets by delivering standardized products and services on a global scale and very idiosyncratic 
local institutional frameworks that require the development of a specific nonmarket strategy (Doh, 
et al., 2015; Kobrin, 2015; Peng, et al., 2008). The head offices of MNEs generally pass the 
responsibility of coping with these discrepancies on to their subsidiaries, which are therefore in turn 
confronted with an institutional duality: they must respond to both a within-organization set of 
pressures to conform to global decisions and a host country set of pressures to conform to local 
institutional patterns (Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Nell, Puck, & Heidenreich, 2015). 
In this context, subsidiaries play the role of boundary spanners, facilitating the transfer of 
knowledge and practices between host and home countries (Khan, Lew, & Sinkovics, 2015; Patriotta, 
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Castellano, & Wright, 2013). As they develop a capacity to ‘read’ local institutional configurations 
(Montiel, Husted, & Christmann, 2012) and invest in relationships with key influential nonmarket 
actors in the environment in which they operate (Darendeli & Hill, 2016), subsidiaries become 
“anchored in the local context, which keeps them informed about relevant issues in the host 
environment” (Kostova, Nell, & Hoenen, 2018, p. 2620). By developing nonmarket strategies, they 
gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the host country’s government (Banerjee & Venaik, 2018), improve their 
market visibility (Puck, Rogers, & Mohr, 2013) and potentially increase their capacity to leverage 
resources in order to enhance their market presence (Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006; Lawton, 
McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013). The embeddedness of subsidiaries in their host countries’ institutional 
environments impacts on their ability to transfer the organizational practices adopted by their global 
head offices through diffusion and institutionalization at their local level (Kostova, 1999). This 
transfer may mean that organizational practices must be adapted, or even transformed, into a form 
that fits with the local environment (Kostova, Marano, & Tallman, 2016; Yu & Zaheer, 2010).  
This institutional duality is likely to oblige a subsidiary to invest in costly and resource-
consuming nonmarket activities as a way of negotiating its standing in the host context (Blumentritt, 
2003; Nell, et al., 2015). The process by which subsidiaries cope with the dual pressure remains 
largely unexplored, however. In particular, the implementation of nonmarket strategies at the early 
stages of a subsidiary’s entry, when global/local tensions first appear, seems to be critical to the 
success of an MNE’s international expansion. Tensions are particularly acute at these early stages, as 
MNEs transfer knowledge and practices that originated in their home institutional environment: 
when they open subsidiaries across the world, MNEs do not just offer a standardized product or 
service on multiple markets – they carry their home country’s institutional values into different 
foreign countries through these products and services. As subsidiaries generally have some degree 
of autonomy from their head offices, the creation of a fit with their host countries’ laws and 
regulations while also maintaining their fit with their parent companies is a particularly daunting 
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challenge. This paper investigates this issue by looking at the nonmarket strategy developed by eBay 
in France, which is a subsidiary of eBay Inc.  
3 Context and Methods 
3.1 National context 
France has more of a coordinated market economy than countries such as the UK or the USA 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001; Witt & Jackson, 2016), which makes it particularly relevant for a study of the 
nonmarket strategies of international subsidiaries. In particular, the French State is traditionally a 
major player in the creation and development of new organizational forms, as “new industry 
creation… reflects the government’s dominant role, with a disproportionate number of innovations 
taking place in large, technology-intensive systems conceived with the development of breakthrough 
innovations for public sector markets in view” (Spencer, Murtha, & Lenway, 2005: 331). When 
Internet-based businesses first appeared, for example, they were viewed with suspicion by the 
French regulator, partly because they were inspired by entrepreneurs who were driven by market 
opportunities rather than coordinated government initiatives (Jeunemaître & Dumez, 2003). In 2000, 
the government created an advisory board known as the ‘Forum on Internet Rights’ (‘Forum des 
droits de l’Internet’) to identify potential Internet-related issues. It was financed by, and reported to, 
the Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment, and its mandate was to bring together 
government representatives and Internet actors to help the government frame new regulations. It 
also became the source of recommendations on the regulation of Internet-based businesses such as 
eBay. 
3.2 eBay in France 
eBay was founded in California, USA in 1995. It owns and runs an internet-based 
marketplace also named ‘eBay’ that enables individuals with an eBay account to buy and sell items 
through electronic auctions or at a fixed price. The sellers are private individuals who use the 
marketplace as an ‘online garage sale’, shopkeepers who see eBay as an opportunity to make extra 
money and entrepreneurs who have started a business on eBay.  
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Before eBay internationalized in France, a similar business named iBazar was launched by 
two French entrepreneurs in 1998, becoming the national leader. Following a strategy of expansion 
in Europe, eBay Corporation acquired iBazar in 2001 and created ebay.fr, a rapidly-growing national 
auction-based e-marketplace with an international reach. As long as the business remained a niche 
actor on the French retail scene, it remained outside the scope of regulatory authorities, but its fast 
growth disturbed the status quo in the retail industry and raised regulatory issues, which were 
handled by the Chief Executive Officer of eBay France and successive Chief Legal Officers, who were 
trained lawyers. Interactions between the regulator and eBay France became more frequent, and 
revealed an increasing interdependence between the subsidiary and the regulator. 
The relationship between eBay’s head office and its French subsidiary was a blend of 
autonomy and dependence. As the CEO of ebay.fr explained, “There was a global strategic line that 
all countries fell into, which had to do with the product itself”: eBay was a global platform that 
offered the same features and functionalities throughout the world. Subsidiaries could ask for 
changes to be made to these features on an annual basis, and their requests were reviewed by the 
U.S. head office. eBay subsidiaries enjoyed autonomy from head office as long as no change to the 
platform was involved: for example, the French subsidiary enjoyed autonomy in the running of its 
daily operations and finding ways to cope with local specificities, including institutions.1  
3.3 Data collection 
Our study relied for the most part on archival data, which we complemented with interview-
based data (see Appendix A for a summary of the data collection). In the case of the archival data, 
we followed a historiographic approach (Ventresca & Mohr, 2005). We focused on a single 
organization – eBay – and built a chronology of its expansion in France. The choice was made to 
cover the time period between 2004, when eBay started having recurring interactions with the 
                                                          
1 eBay subsidiaries in Europe report to the regional European headquarters in addition to the global head 
office in the US. The regional European headquarters were responsible for implementing the regional 
economic targets set at a global level and for monitoring the performance of national subsidiaries (growth, 
costs, budgets, etc.).  
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regulator, and 2010, by which time eBay had gained institutional legitimacy. In line with our 
objective to build a longitudinal case study of eBay’s entry into and expansion in the French market, 
we collected the data by reading archives covering the period between 2004 and 2010, focusing on 
information related to flows of communication between the two parties. Government rules, bills, 
decrees and laws were accessed through Légifrance, the French government body that publishes 
and distributes all legal texts, decrees, and court rulings (legifrance.gouv.fr). Governmental reports 
and other texts were accessed through more specific websites such as that of the Forum on Internet 
Rights, which remained open for archival searches even after the Forum was dissolved in December 
2010 (foruminternet.org), and the archive section of the website of the Ministry of Small & Medium-
Sized Businesses, Commerce, Crafts and Liberal Professions (pme.gouv.fr)2. Other secondary data 
include analyses and descriptions of government decisions by observers, analysts, data from 
journalists, the websites of professional associations (e.g. fevad.com), online newspapers (e.g. 
journaldunet.com and zdnet.fr), business newspapers (e.g. lesechos.fr, latribune.fr, and 
lexpansion.lexpress.fr), legal websites (e.g. legalis.net) and international sources (e.g. The Financial 
Times and the BBC). These documents also provided details of the interactions between eBay and 
the French government. Data providing more specific details of eBay’s actions were collected from 
the archive section of eBay France’s website. All the news published between January 2006 (the first 
date it was available online) and December 2010 was retrieved from actualites.ebay.fr. This news 
page – which comprises around 100 items a year – targets eBay users and provides information on 
technical changes to the platform, new rules, new tariffs and promotional campaigns. A total of 776 
documents covering the history of eBay in France between 2004 and 2010 were collected 
electronically and analyzed for the study. 
As archival data tend to record the visible and official rather than ‘off-the-record’ aspects of 
an organization (Liu & Grey, 2018), and because it is difficult to evaluate the reliability of information 
                                                          
2 This ministry, created in May 2005, became a Secretariat of State two years later and merged with the 
Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment. 
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included in archival documents (Barnes, Dang, Leavitt, Guarana, & Uhlmann, 2018), we conducted a 
series of confirmatory interviews. We focused on three types of informant: senior managers at eBay 
France who had been involved in discussions with the regulatory authorities in the period being 
studied; representatives of the government who interacted with eBay managers; and managers at 
PriceMinister (eBay’s main competitor in France at the time) who had been involved in discussions 
with eBay (11 persons in total - see Appendix A). The questions put to them were aimed at 
corroborating the chronology of interactions we had derived from the archival data. They also 
provided an inside view of these interactions, revealing informal elements of the relations between 
eBay and the government. The questions to eBay managers focused on the reasons why eBay had 
engaged in interactions with the regulator, how each round of interactions had unfolded and the 
interpretations and arguments developed by eBay personnel during the discussions (see examples in 
Appendix B). The questions to members of the government and PriceMinister managers were 
intended to triangulate the factual elements disclosed by eBay managers, in particular where the 
archival data did not enable reliable triangulation. This was not always necessary, however: for 
example, eBay’s description of its defense positions in the lawsuits in which it was involved was 
easily triangulated by comparing it with official and legal documents and journalists’ reports of the 
proceedings, while on the other hand, eBay’s account of the discussions in the Forum on Internet 
Rights required triangulation with another inside account. These focused confirmatory interviews 
were conducted face to face (3 managers of eBay France), over the telephone (3 managers of eBay 
France, 2 representatives of the government, and 1 manager of PriceMinister) and electronically (by 
sending a list of questions to the respondents when a face-to-face or telephone interview was not 
possible: 1 representative of the government and 1 PriceMinister manager).  
In Figure 1, we map the relationships among the eBay executives we studied and between 
the subsidiary and its competitors, local incumbents, and various nonmarket actors.  
-------------------------------------------------- 




3.4 Data analysis 
Our data analysis followed three steps. The first was to build a chronology of eBay’s 
internationalization process in France from 2005 to 2010. This included all events recorded in the 
archival documents on ebay.fr. From this eclectic dataset, a distinction was made between relevant 
and irrelevant events. Events were considered to be relevant when they made up ‘situations’: that is, 
when they involved a series of interactions between eBay, incumbents and regulators around a 
decision to be taken in which new interpretive frameworks were developed and discussed. Seven 
such situations were identified. The interviews with eBay managers confirmed that all seven 
situations were relevant, and that no other major situation had taken place involving eBay and the 
French regulator, thereby validating our chronology. 
Our second step was to structure our process data into a longitudinal case study. We wrote 
a detailed account for each situation based on the archival data and confirmatory interviews, 
combining ‘narration’ and ‘time-bracketing’ data analysis strategies (Langley, 1999). More 
specifically, the seven situations were categorized according to the type of nonmarket strategy eBay 
built to cope with them, which was either defensive or proactive. Figure 2 presents a chronology of 
the situations that developed during eBay’s internationalization in France and the nonmarket 
strategies associated with each of them. This figure is described and commented on further in the 
findings section below. 
The third step of our analysis consisted of building a theoretically informed interpretation of 
the case study. While acknowledging that “the meaning of [archival] documents is a matter of 
interpretation by researchers” (Liu & Grey, 2018, p. 647), we were careful to go back and forth 
between the data and the literature to avoid the “problem of forcing fit”: that is, developing an 
explanatory scheme too early (Vaughan, 1992, p. 195). Based on the factual accounts in step 2, we 
progressively developed an assessment for each situation of how eBay used defensive self-
categorization strategies and evolved towards more proactive strategies, thus reinforcing its role in 




INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------- 
4 Findings 
As a multinational company founded in economically liberal California, eBay was confronted 
with an exceptionally challenging institutional environment when it entered the French market. The 
CEO of eBay France recalled: “The French institutional environment was always more challenging, 
and it required us to have conversations with key national institutions or to make sure we were 
careful about how we managed certain aspects of the growth”. In this section, we describe how the 
subsidiary successfully built its own nonmarket strategic fit in France by deploying and refining a 
definition of itself over time. We focus on key controversial situations that posed potential 
challenges (leading to defensive nonmarket strategies) and provided potential opportunities (leading 
to proactive nonmarket strategies) in the subsidiary’s international expansion. Although the 
defensive and proactive strategies were launched by the subsidiary simultaneously, we present 
them in succession for the purpose of clarity. 
4.1  Defensive nonmarket strategies 
Whenever it was threatened by its institutional environment, eBay France reacted by 
delimiting its responsibility and avoiding potentially threatening institutional decisions. Successive 
situations led to increasingly intense forms of self-categorization. Below, we present four situations 
that are representative of the subsidiary’s use of self-categorization as a defensive strategy. 
4.1.1 Labels as a protection against new regulations: The ‘Forum on Internet Rights’ situation 
The rapid growth of eBay in France led to the platform’s activity coming under the scrutiny 
of the regulator as early as 2004. In the regulator’s view, eBay France had become an enabler of tax 
evasion, a way for sellers of large quantities of goods to fly under the tax authorities’ radar. This was 
a potential issue for eBay’s subsidiary, and triggered increased discussions and negotiations with the 
regulatory authorities.  
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In 2004, the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry requested the creation of a working 
group within the Forum for Internet Rights to assess whether e-commerce platforms should control 
their sellers more closely. Repeated discussions and negotiations took place between May 2004 and 
November 2005, the subsidiary’s main objective being to defend itself against further regulations. 
B.D., the Chief Legal Officer of eBay France, who sat on the Forum on Internet Rights on behalf of the 
subsidiary, explained that eBay’s “objective in the Forum was to think of a way to develop its activity 
harmoniously with the authorities... [and] for [eBay’s] activity to stop being seen as dodgy, as a 
platform for tax evaders”. eBay achieved this by profiling the platform in such a way that it would be 
viewed by the regulatory authorities as being reliable and safe.  
During the negotiations, eBay sought to convince the government representatives that its 
platform was an enabler of transactions, an online tool that improved transparency and fluidity 
between buyers and sellers. The subsidiary’s managers proposed that eBay should be labeled as a 
‘broker’ rather than as an ‘agent’. As a broker, the platform had no responsibility other than to 
provide the technical tools to facilitate transactions. Unlike other French e-marketplaces, such as 
PriceMinister, which acted as agents for their sellers, eBay claimed that it did not represent the 
sellers’ interests, and so was in no way responsible for their actions, including possible tax evasion. 
The subsidiary’s managers claimed that a decision by the government to impose further monitoring 
obligations on eBay would conflict with its true role as a broker.  
The categorization of eBay as a ‘broker’ was partly a defensive strategy to avoid the 
additional costs associated with legal constraints. As the government-appointed convener of the 
discussions (B.T.) recalls: “For eBay there was a fear of getting trapped in commitments beyond the 
existing laws… Their dynamic approach could be halted if [the discussion group] came up with 
recommendations that ‘we need a new law to police big sellers and force them to pay 15% tax’.”  
In the final report published by the Forum on Internet Rights in November 2005, eBay’s 
categorization as a broker was officially recognized and distinguished from other operators. In 
particular, Chapter 2 of the report detailed the “liability schemes of online platforms” by 
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distinguishing between the “agent model” and the “broker model”.  Through labeling, eBay France 
protected itself against the potential nonmarket threats that affected other labels. It also exploited 
the position that a broker was by definition ‘non-interventionist’ and ‘neutral’. By so doing, it 
conveyed the position that its tasks included connecting buyers and sellers and facilitating trades, 
but that monitoring transactions and reporting tax evaders were not within its remit. The label 
became a ‘container’ of meaningful rhetoric for influencing institutional authorities. 
4.1.2 Using rhetoric as a defense against assaults from incumbents: the ‘auction sales’ situation 
The first incumbent actor that entered into conflict with eBay France was the Council of 
Auctioneers (“Conseil des Ventes Volontaires”, or CVV), the professional association responsible for 
liaising with the government on the regulation of auction sales. France had stricter regulations than 
other countries in this area, as all auctions had to be carried out by accredited auctioneers and 
authorized by the CVV. The association requested that eBay France activities be made subject to its 
supervision, and when the subsidiary refused in 2007, it launched legal proceedings claiming an 
infringement of the regulation. In the CVV’s opinion, eBay’s auction algorithm was similar to 
traditional auctions, whereas eBay’s position was that the claim represented a novel situation. 
During the trial, eBay France used and refined its self-categorization as a broker. It adopted 
the position that auction sales and brokerage were incompatible because auctions required an 
auctioneer to act as the sellers’ agent. The Chief Legal Officer (B.D.) recalled: “eBay’s position was to 
say ‘we don’t do auction sales, we do online auctions’, and we wouldn’t use the term ‘auction sales’ 
because we weren’t the sellers’ agents”. A.V.S, the CEO of eBay France, remembered that eBay’s 
stance towards the Council of Auctioneers was along these lines: “Look, we are not an auction site. 
In our case, an auction is just a pricing format, one that we call an auction format, but we are not an 
auctioneer. We do not physically inspect the goods we are about to sell, and we do not put a value 
on them; the seller puts a value on them”.  
Over the course of three years of legal proceedings and several appeals by the CVV, eBay 
France specified the auction-like attributes attached to the ‘broker’ label. The CEO stated that the 
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need to defend his company against the CVV had an impact on how the firm defined its activity: 
“Certainly, our point of view was always very strongly that we shouldn’t be regulated by the CVV. 
This case greatly impacted the way we talked about ourselves, and hence the way we defended 
ourselves”. By proposing the notion of ‘online auctions’ and contrasting it with ‘auction sales’, the 
subsidiary attached an ad hoc attribute to the label. It further expanded the ‘online broker’ label so 
that it tied in naturally with online auctions. In so doing, it distinguished itself from traditional 
auction houses, which were within the remit of the CVV.  
When the trial concluded in 2010, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (the High Court 
of Paris) found that: “eBay’s activity is characteristic of brokerage through electronic auctions… 
which excludes classification as an agent of the seller” and “no condition of auction sales is 
present”3. By this statement, the Court accepted that online auctions (which were relabeled 
“electronic” auctions) were a legitimate attribute of online brokerage. It also noted the 
incompatibility between traditional auction sales and brokerage. The subsidiary was successful in 
developing its rhetoric, and managed to differentiate itself further from the ‘agent’ category, hence 
sheltering itself from constraining regulations. Institutional distance was somehow addressed 
through rhetorical distancing. In some other cases, however, rhetorical tactics proved to be less 
successful, as we demonstrate below.  
4.1.3 When defensive rhetoric fails: the ‘luxury industry’ situation 
The second group of actors who entered into legal conflict with the eBay subsidiary was the 
luxury industry, notably the luxury brand giant LVMH. The French luxury industry had traditionally 
organized its distribution through exclusive channels, and imposed strict controls on its retailers. 
Despite these restrictions, luxury branded items were finding their way on to ebay.fr and other eBay 
national websites. The companies behind these brands formed the opinion that eBay was infringing 
their selective distribution system, claiming that putting their branded items on the website was 
                                                          
3 Source: Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 5th Chamber, 1st Section. Judgment dated 25 May 2010. 




illegal and should be prohibited. In 2006, LVMH companies such as Dior, Kenzo, Givenchy, Louis 
Vuitton and Guerlain commenced legal proceedings against eBay International AG, the European 
headquarters hosting ebay.fr.  
The subsidiary once again made use of the ‘broker’ label to protect itself against the risk of 
having additional restrictions placed on its transactions. During the 2008 trial with luxury perfume 
brands, eBay’s lawyers limited and qualified the scope of the label, adding references to selective 
distribution, as this excerpt from the record of the proceedings shows: “eBay replied [to the 
plaintiffs] by stressing its quality as a host, as a mere technical service provider whose liability is 
limited to the law in force, and which is no exception for selective distribution; […] and the absence 
of any breach of the plaintiffs’ networks by eBay, since eBay does not make any sales itself”4.  
The court judgment offered crumbs of comfort to both sides. In favor of eBay International 
AG, it confirmed that the platform was a “brokerage website [and that] the essence of the service 
provided [was] intermediation between buyers and sellers”. In the luxury industry’s favor, it 
conceded that “by its nature, the quality of broker [did] not imply the absence of knowledge and 
control”5. In particular, the Commercial Court of Paris required the subsidiary to incorporate 
‘control’ features into its brokerage function, a shift away from the ‘neutral brokerage’ rhetoric 
developed in the 2006 Forum on Internet Rights report. All the court judgments involving luxury 
brands reached similar conclusions, and despite several appeals, eBay France lost all the cases it was 
involved in.  
These judgments forced the subsidiary to monitor its transactions more closely, which 
involved making difficult adjustments to its self-categorization as a neutral, non-intervening broker. 
The CEO explained how “the legal case resulted in injunctions which meant that [eBay France] had to 
prohibit the sale of all luxury perfumes, period”. He further detailed the problem with reconciling 
                                                          
4 Source: Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, 1st Chamber B. Judgment dated 30 June 2008, Parfums Christian Dior 
and others / eBay Inc, eBay International AG. Available at: 




the required adjustments with “brokerage liability”: “What we did not do – and we were very 
conscious of this, because of eBay’s brokerage liability – was hire hundreds of people to start going 
through items manually and filtering them out. We did make adjustments, with automatic filters. So 
obviously certain items got filtered out automatically.” These automatic procedures were added to 
the algorithm system with the approval of the US head office, and constituted a new technological 
functionality at eBay France. Because they were applied indiscriminately as part of the 
intermediation service, they enabled the subsidiary to comply with the new legal requirements while 
keeping its self-categorization as a neutral broker unaltered.  
4.1.4 Building persuasive rhetoric to prevent new constraining laws: the ‘Marini bill’ situation 
In 2008, the Financial Commissioner of the French Senate, Philippe Marini, proposed an 
amendment bill that required ebay.fr and other e-commerce platforms to identify sellers whose 
yearly sales exceeded €5,000 and to report their details to the authorities. The re-emergence of the 
tax evasion question through a different institutional channel (the Senate) represented a new 
situation for the company. eBay France and the owners of two other French online marketplaces 
(PriceMinister and Amazon) launched a joint action against the bill, developing two main lines of 
argument. First, they used the final report of the Forum on Internet Rights to illustrate the 
inconsistency of setting a revenue threshold. The possibility of a threshold to identify business 
sellers had been explicitly ruled out in the final 2005 report, partly as a result of eBay’s claim that it 
would discourage online sales and was unmanageable in practice. Besides, as the Chief Legal Officer 
(B.D.) recalled, establishing a threshold would lead eBay to “decide who should be business sellers, 
which [would mean] that eBay was no longer a broker, because eBay would intervene in its 
marketplace far more than it would by remaining at a neutral, technical level”. The previous ‘no 
threshold’ decision agreed by the government in 2005 was used in 2008 to remind the institutional 
authorities of their prior position and to demonstrate the inconsistency of the bill. The use of the 
Forum’s discussions as a defense position against the Marini bill was confirmed by B.T., who had 
convened the discussions: “eBay used the Forum’s report to nip certain government-initiated 
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projects like the Marini bill in the bud …  By using the Forum document, [eBay managers] were able 
to say ‘wait a minute, you set a threshold, you ask us to do certain things, but look what the report 
you agreed with says – it says no threshold’. I’m simplifying it, but that’s how the document was 
used.” 
Second, the subsidiary’s lawyers used the Forum’s final report and the broker label. The 
Chief Legal Officer (E.G.) recalled how the subsidiary vehemently resisted the Marini bill by affirming 
that the platform “was not a tax inspector but a neutral broker, a mere host of business sellers, 
independent business owners who were responsible for their own tax returns”. By developing a 
persuasive rhetoric around the past agreements on thresholds and the fact that eBay France could 
not request private details from its sellers for tax purposes, the firm further expanded its self-
categorization in relation to the situation at stake. This defense strategy was successful, and the bill 
was withdrawn in December 2008.  
To sum up, international firms such as eBay can disturb the established institutional 
environment of the host country when they open subsidiaries. Under these circumstances, 
incumbents may resort to existing regulations to defend the status quo. eBay’s subsidiary used a 
self-categorization strategy to carve out a defense. By developing a label for itself and putting it into 
effect, and by having this label accepted by the regulatory authorities, the subsidiary disassociated 
itself from other categories that fell within the reach of the constraining regulations and created a 
protected space for its activities. As new situations emerged, the subsidiary resorted to rhetorical 
tactics aimed at refining and classifying the label. As a result, the ‘broker’ label became more 
intricate, and was tailored to each new situation, thereby greatly influencing nonmarket actors’ 
interpretation of the subsidiary. 
4.2 Proactive nonmarket strategies 
Starting in 2007, the parent company took the strategic decision to promote business sales, 
as business sellers meant higher reliability and higher sales volumes than private sellers. eBay France 
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needed government support to encourage business creation on its platform. Three situations led the 
subsidiary to refine its self-categorization in order to foster regulatory change. 
4.2.1 Complementing the ‘broker’ label with new narratives: the ‘Dutreil Charter’ situation 
As its business grew and the number of sellers of large quantities of goods increased 
steadily, eBay was aware that it might show up on the regulator’s radar again. In 2006, a year after 
the Forum’s report was published, eBay decided to anticipate a possible change of mood at the 
government level and proposed its own solution to the nonmarket problem. In collaboration with 
the Federation of E-Commerce and Distance Sellers (FEVAD)6, it co-authored a document that took 
the position that while reasserting its status as a neutral broker, eBay also committed itself to 
assisting the government in its fight against tax evaders by communicating proactively with its large 
sellers and urging them to self-declare as businesses. In exchange, it requested the government’s 
support in helping these individuals to transform their activities into businesses. By so doing, eBay 
complemented the ‘broker’ label with notions of entrepreneurship and business creation. 
eBay France and FEVAD enrolled the Minister of Small & Medium-Sized Businesses, 
Commerce, Crafts and Liberal Professions, Renaud Dutreil7 in this initiative. The subsidiary’s Chief 
Legal Officer (B.D.) recalled that Dutreil “was extremely receptive to the fact that [eBay France] had 
thought about this notion of tax evasion” and “was happy to see that efforts [were] moving in the 
right direction”. Dutreil agreed to sign the document (which was later named the ‘Dutreil Charter’), 
thereby giving the French subsidiary its first institutional recognition.  
With this initiative, eBay France imposed the narrative that far from being merely driven by 
the need to defend its business interests against regulation, it was taking a positive approach 
towards the national nonmarket environment, and was ready to support the government in tackling 
the problem of tax evasion. The document laid the ground for an emerging partnership between the 
subsidiary and the government around business creation, which was presented in the Charter as a 
                                                          
6 The French federation of online retailers. 
7 This was confirmed by Mr Dutreil in an interview. 
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“mutual commitment of online platforms and public authorities”. In particular, Points 11 and 12 of 
the Charter stated that eBay was committed to collaborating with the Minister to encourage sellers 
and inform them of the steps they needed to take in order to create a business. As B.D. explained, 
“One of the areas in which we [eBay France] contributed to the evolution of the law was where 
regulations did not exist. We tried to self-regulate by putting in place codes of practice or charters to 
try to pave the way towards new regulations – a more balanced regulatory environment, so to 
speak.” The Dutreil Charter represented the first step towards more proactive attempts to transform 
the institutional framework (“pave the way towards new regulations”) in a way that was more 
favorable to eBay (“a more balanced regulatory environment”). 
4.2.2 Using narratives to develop associations with the authorities: the Chatel Law situation 
eBay’s growth in France was constrained by recurring complaints about the lack of reliability 
of certain sellers and their reluctance to export, unlike UK and German sellers. An opportunity to 
overcome these limitations arose with the publication of a European Directive to improve consumer 
protection, part of which related directly to e-commerce and Internet platforms. The aim of the 
Directive was to offer greater protection to online consumers and harmonize regulations across 
Europe. It targeted business (as opposed to private) sales, which were making up an increasing 
proportion of eBay’s sales at the time.  
The subsidiary lobbied the members of the government responsible for transposing the 
Directive, in particular the Secretary of State for Industry and Consumer Affairs, Luc Chatel. eBay 
France’s objective was to ensure strict application of the e-commerce elements of the Directive. 
E.G., the Chief Legal Officer at eBay France, who negotiated with Chatel, recalled how she explained 
to the government that eBay’s scope had expanded beyond mere brokerage to include ‘business 
growth’: “The Chatel Law was an opportunity to meet government representatives and explain that 
our small and medium firms on eBay were struggling to export. The message we sent to the 
government was that now that the decision had been taken to clearly distinguish a business seller 
from a private seller, and the DNA of eBay was more and more about enabling small businesses to 
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grow, it was time to give support and a level playing field to small and medium firms that wanted to 
grow”.  
The sellers’ problems with growth were partly due to differences in regulations across 
European countries, which forced them to change their practices depending on where they were 
shipping their products. E.G. recalled that eBay’s objective was “to harmonize regulations in Europe 
in order to facilitate exports”, and that “[her] work with Mr Chatel was mainly to make the voices of 
business sellers heard and to guarantee a higher level of quality and safety for buyers”.  
In this situation, eBay France developed a new narrative around the notion of ‘business 
growth’ and the platform’s responsibility to address the difficulties experienced by small businesses. 
This narrative enabled the subsidiary to imbue the ‘broker’ label with positive attributes. As E.G. 
recalled, eBay’s arguments were as follows: “Look, our French sellers export, they’re vibrant, and 
there’s potential for economic growth. These sellers are your small and medium-sized enterprises 
who want to grow further… Help them to export, to reach the level of activity they have trouble 
reaching by themselves. Simplify and harmonize the rules!” The growth and job creation argument 
was a way of associating the platform’s activities with the institutional environment, a point 
confirmed by the other Chief Legal Officer, B.D.: “When you talk about job creation, governments 
start listening to you. Because they’re interested. Because more jobs mean more taxes, more VAT, 
etc. By saying all this to the government, we were able to push our ideas forward.” 
The “Law for the Development of Competition to the Advantage of Consumers”, also called 
the ‘Chatel Law’, was passed by Parliament in December 2007. As the subsidiary had requested, the 
law was a strict application of the European Directive. It created a level playing field with other 
European countries, making it a legal requirement for online businesses to provide a delivery date 
and contact details and to refund buyers’ orders and shipping costs in case of a cancelation within 14 
days. eBay France used the new law to force its business sellers to improve the quality of their 
services. As the CEO (A.V.S.) explained, once the new law became active, “the point was to 
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communicate with business sellers, saying ‘dear business sellers, there have been changes in online 
sales regulations, so from now on you need to do things differently’.”  
By widening the scope of the ‘broker’ label to include new narratives, eBay France created a 
consistent association between nonmarket actors, who strove for better conditions for growth, and 
the internal requirement imposed by the head office to raise the quality and international scope of 
its seller base. The new law enabled the subsidiary to achieve these objectives while formally 
remaining a neutral, non-intervening broker. With the Chatel Law, the legal environment became 
better aligned with the platform’s activity, an ally for the dissemination of its organizational 
practices and a factor of institutional legitimization. 
4.2.3 Influencing institutions through positive narratives: the ‘auto-entrepreneur law’ situation  
With its increasing focus on business sales worldwide, eBay relied on individual 
entrepreneurs to grow its base of small businesses. This proved difficult to achieve in France, 
however, because, as the Chief Legal Officer (E.G.), explained, French regulations made the process 
of launching a business complicated and costly. These regulations had to change. The CEO of eBay 
France explained: “From 2007, we started becoming more proactively involved. We tried to reach 
out to certain institutional individuals who we thought were the friendlier parties in the government 
and made sure we built relationships. And that’s how the Novelli Law on auto-entrepreneurship 
came about”.  
In 2007, the newly-elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed a committee to 
gather new ideas for liberalizing the economy. eBay France saw this initiative as an opportunity to 
continue what it had started with the Dutreil Charter, when it requested the government’s support 
with helping large private sellers become businesses. In response to the committee’s call for new 
ideas, it submitted a proposal on online entrepreneurship and stressed the need to facilitate the 
creation of businesses in France. In the process, the subsidiary developed a narrative of eBay as a 
vector for entrepreneurship. The Chief Legal Officer (E.G.) recalled how when she met the convener 
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of the committee8, she described “eBay’s actions to promote entrepreneurship and the feedback 
from sellers that it [was] difficult to create a business here in France”. On behalf of eBay France, she 
asked the regulator to “support [its] efforts by creating a legal status to encourage business 
creation”. A.V.S. confirmed that the subsidiary’s involvement “was very much submitting the idea of 
facilitating entrepreneurship, and then later, when Novelli rolled it out, [the involvement was] 
communicating, celebrating, and championing it”. 
To supplement these business arguments, eBay France developed a series of social 
narratives. It presented itself as a platform that helped marginalized people who were struggling to 
find a job and earn a living. The subsidiary hired an independent research agency to carry out a 
survey on business creation on its platform. As the CEO explained, the survey9 “provided a bit of 
eBay marketing muscle in favor of the auto-entrepreneurship law”, as it revealed that “of 10,000 
business sellers, 30% were formerly unemployed and had worked their way out of unemployment 
thanks to eBay [and] another 14% or so were disabled, and again, eBay had given them a chance to 
become professionally active.” Through presenting itself as a promoter of entrepreneurship and a 
vector of social integration, eBay France reinforced its association with the pro-market government 
of the time.  
In 2008, the Secretary of State for Small- and Medium-Sized Firms, Hervé Novelli, 
transcribed some of the committee’s conclusions into regulations. The new law on ‘auto-
entrepreneurship’, which had shared features with eBay’s proposal, was passed by parliament. eBay 
France became an active supporter. As A.V.S. explained, “for the government, eBay was a very good 
case study of precisely that kind of behavior, of auto-entrepreneurs who had started a business from 
scratch”. The Chief Legal Officer (B.T.) of PriceMinister, its main competitor, confirmed that “eBay 
was far more vocal than PriceMinister on the topic of auto-entrepreneurship, because they needed 
                                                          
8 The Committee was led by Jacques Attali (a high profile political adviser and senior civil servant), and was 
made up of academics (economists, historians, and scientists), lawyers, politicians, CEOs, union leaders, 
journalists, etc. It had 42 members. 
9 The survey was carried out by the market survey company Nielsen and was released mid-2008. 
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this new law to grow their seller base”. He recalled how “eBay worked with members of 
parliament… to validate what Novelli was saying, and then to make the new law a success among its 
sellers”.  
The initiator of the law, Hervé Novelli, confirmed in an interview that auto-entrepreneur 
status had been originally designed with Internet firms and e-commerce in mind in order to make 
online platforms such as ebay.fr a vehicle for individual business creation, anticipating what would 
later come to be called the ‘gig economy’. eBay France and its nonmarket environment became 
closely aligned: by encouraging auto-entrepreneurship, the company contributed towards making 
the new law a success, and the new law enabled the firm to grow further.  
To sum up, by using proactive self-categorization strategies, the subsidiary reached a stage 
where it created its own fit with the institutional environment. It broadened the scope of its self-
category to include positive narratives showing how the platform’s activities contributed towards 
growth, job creation, entrepreneurship and the reinsertion of the socially marginalized. The platform 
was no longer at odds with the legal framework: it was understood and accepted by incumbents, 
and legitimized through new regulations the subsidiary had to some extent helped to shape. eBay 
France was inscribed in a renewed institutional environment that was partly spurred by, and fully 
supportive of, its activities. 
5 Discussion 
In this paper, we have sought to explain how MNE subsidiaries develop nonmarket 
strategies to create a fit between a global market strategy and the local nonmarket framework of 
their host countries. Our findings, which are summarized in Figure 3, suggest that the subsidiary 
managed its nonmarket environment through self-categorization, in constantly renewed efforts to 
define its activity in accordance with new situations. The categorization was dynamic, in the sense 
that the strategies to build the self-category evolved between defensive (resisting pressure to 
conform to existing regulations) and proactive (seizing opportunities for new supportive 
regulations). These two self-categorization strategies resonate with the two mechanisms of 
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transference developed by Kostova (1999): the diffusion and institutionalization of organizational 
practices. In the process, self-categorization tactics evolved from labels and rhetorical contributions 
to disassociating the subsidiary from other categories that were subject to existing regulations 
(defensive self-categorization), to narratives contributing towards associating the subsidiary with 
new institutional frameworks (proactive self-categorization). Through the process, the subsidiary 
created a nonmarket strategic fit that aligned the pressure from its head office to adopt global 
organizational practices with local institutional contingencies. Our findings contribute to the 
institution-based view of international business strategy in two ways: first, they expand and deepen 
our understanding of self-categorization as a nonmarket strategy in international contexts; and 
second, they show the processes by which self-categorization supports the transfer of an MNE’s 
organizational practices from its country of origin to the host country.  We now discuss these two 
contributions in greater detail.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5.1 Self-categorization as a nonmarket strategy for MNE subsidiaries 
Our study contributes to the institution-based view of IB strategy by providing a novel 
understanding of how MNE subsidiaries cope with institutional duality. Previous studies have 
proposed that “how [MNEs] internationalize … is inherently shaped by the domestic and 
international institutional frameworks governing [the companies] endeavors” (Peng, et al., 2008, p. 
931). From this perspective, the choice of nonmarket strategies by MNEs is determined by the level 
of institutional constraints and legacies of the host country (Nell, et al., 2015; Peng, et al., 2008; 
Rajwani & Liedong, 2015). In contrast, our findings suggest a more agentic view of MNE subsidiaries, 
one that highlights processes of company self-categorization aimed at creating a nonmarket 
strategic fit in the host country.  
Self-categorization refers to the process by which a firm strategically defines itself as a 
member or non-member of a strategic group in an attempt to reduce uncertainty in its nonmarket 
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local environment and to safeguard the transfer of its global activities. This self-categorization 
process is agentic in that the subsidiary develops a category for itself rather than letting actors in the 
environment (governments, regulators, or incumbents) define its activities. This insight is 
theoretically relevant because it suggests that MNE subsidiaries are not the passive recipients of 
categories that emerge at a macro-institutional level. Instead, because subsidiaries of MNEs are 
under pressure to transfer global activities that have been designed by their head offices and must 
face the institutional pressures and opportunities of their host country (see Figure 3), they resort to 
self-categorization to establish a fit between their global activities and their nonmarket local 
environment. In this process, the categories are equally the result of macro-level constraints (both 
institutional and market-related) and micro-level (organizational) decisions. Therefore, self-
categorization represents a way of addressing the “institutional duality” between host country 
conditions and the MNE’s policy (Kostova & Roth, 2002).  
Previous studies in the strategy field have emphasized the regulatory purpose of categories, 
and conceptualized the process of categorization as “a multiplayer contest where firms and 
regulators attempt to disrupt or maintain the regulatory category” (Ozcan & Gurses, 2018, p. 1811). 
Studies within this stream have also underlined the use of labels as a partitioning mechanism 
through which categories emerge (Hsu & Grodal, 2015; Zunino, Suarez, & Grodal, 2019). Our findings 
extend these insights in the IB field by pointing to how subsidiaries use different tactics to self-
categorize (see Figure 3). While labels were used in our case to construct partitions (such as the term 
“broker”, which was used to impose an understanding of eBay as a non-intervening actor), other 
tactics were also deployed. In the context of IB, subsidiaries must constantly refine, adjust, and 
expand their self-categories in order to anticipate and respond to the evolution of their institutional 
environment. Our findings suggest that MNE subsidiaries complement labels with rhetoric (e.g. 
‘online auctions’ as a natural feature of ‘brokerage’) and narratives (e.g. ‘eBay as a place for 
entrepreneurship’). In our case, the narratives complemented the labels with positive attributes. For 
example, the ‘place for entrepreneurship’ narrative developed as a positive attribute to complement 
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the ‘broker’ label. We therefore show that self-categorization involves the use of multiple linguistic 
tactics that contribute towards building a category that morphs and adapts to institutional 
specificities and market evolutions.  
By focusing on the tactics that MNE subsidiaries use to self-categorize, we also deepen our 
understanding of the outcomes of self-categorization in an IB context. In particular, we show that 
the effect of self-categorization is not merely the building of a consensus with institutional 
authorities to protect the subsidiary’s business; it is also the creation of meaning to support 
institutional changes consistently with the firm’s strategic evolutions. Previous research has 
highlighted how words, and more broadly rhetorical framing, are used to create resonance with an 
audience and facilitate organizational action, or to directly influence practices in a process of 
enactment (Giorgi, 2017; Lockwood, Giorgi, & Glynn, 2019). Our findings show that through self-
categorization processes, MNE subsidiaries are able to deliver both resonance and enactment. They 
create a shared understanding of who they are and what they do (‘resonance’), which facilitates the 
diffusion of their organizational activities. They also influence their nonmarket environment 
(‘enactment’) and orient institutional frameworks in a way that is favorable to their business 
strategy. Our study therefore expands on existing understandings of the effect of categorization to 
include how the diversity of self-categorization tactics allows subsidiaries to shape their host country 
institutions to some extent, beyond merely accommodating them.  
5.2 Self-categorization and the transfer of MNEs’ organizational practices 
Our findings shed new light on the processes by which MNEs transfer global organizational 
practices to local business contexts through the deployment of nonmarket strategies. Previous 
research has shown how subsidiaries transfer their head offices’ global practices by creating the 
conditions for the diffusion of these practices and their institutionalization (Kostova, 1999; Kostova, 
et al., 2018), which often requires adapting the practices to local institutional requirements 
(Kostova, et al., 2016; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Our study contributes towards research on 
transference by demonstrating that the transfer of organizational practices has a nonmarket 
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dimension. In particular, our findings reveal that in the case of international firms, the transfer of 
organizational practices from home to host country is promoted by a combination of defensive and 
proactive self-categorization. Subsidiaries diffuse the MNE’s global organizational practices locally 
through defensive self-categorization, which protects the MNEs’ activities against local institutional 
pressures. Subsidiaries institutionalize these practices at a local level through proactive self-
categorization, which enables the transfer of certain institutional norms from the country of origin 
to the host country.  
At a more micro level, transfer occurs through processes of dissociation/association. 
Defensive self-categorization enables MNE subsidiaries to dissociate themselves from categories 
that fall within the scope of undesired regulations. Through the use of labels, subsidiaries say not 
only ‘who they are’, but also ‘who they are not.’ For eBay, for example, the label ‘broker’ constituted 
a way of dissociating itself from the constraining regulations that applied to the label ‘agent’ in 
France. Furthermore, subsidiaries use rhetorical tactics as a means to influence the regulator’s 
interpretations of the category. Conversely, proactive self-categorization enables subsidiaries to 
create associations between the global activities of the MNE and local institutions, and to push 
regulatory change in a favorable direction. By making use of narratives that are institutionally 
meaningful and relevant to the firm’s activities (e.g. ‘driver for growth and export’; ‘promoter of 
entrepreneurship’; ‘vector of social reinsertion’), the subsidiary is able to progressively associate 
itself with new, more supportive institutional frameworks, and to take an active, positive role in the 
evolution of its institutional environment.  
Our findings take the notion of ‘situation’ forward to grasp the processes by which 
nonmarket strategies facilitate the transfer of organizational practices. The institution-based view of 
IB assumes that firms approach political action by either awaiting the development of an important 
public policy issue before deciding on their course of action or building an extensive network of 
relationships so that when public policy issues arise that affect their operations, they have the 
contacts and resources in place to address the issue (Elsahn & Benson-Rea, 2018; White, et al., 
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2015). As these issues evolve, they shape the dynamics and scope of a firm’s nonmarket strategy 
(Blumentritt, 2003; Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Doh & Lucea, 2013). By stressing the primacy of 
issues, this view downplays the capacity of the various parties to shape their institutional 
environments according to their interests. The notion of situation seems better suited to capturing 
the fluidity and complexity of the process by which subsidiaries cope with institutional authorities to 
transfer global organizational practices locally. Following Girin (2011), we show that situations 
emerge and unite participants around an undefined object – an ill-founded project, a broad 
question, a vague issue – and that each participant may have different views of the result they want 
to achieve, or even no precise view at all. The issue, project, opportunity, or whatever object lies at 
the center of the situation, is progressively constructed, together with the profiling of each 
participant, during interactions. Through defensive or proactive self-categorization, a subsidiary of 
an MNE ‘projects’ a definition of itself in the direction of nonmarket actors. By so doing, it leverages 
each situation to facilitate the transfer of organizational practices, either through dissociation, to 
avoid further regulation (‘we are a broker, not an agent’), or at a later stage through association, to 
promote new regulations (‘we are a place for entrepreneurship in need of a more favorable 
environment’).  
An emphasis on situations makes a contribution towards answering recent calls from 
proponents of the institution-based view of IB to focus on “how institutional process unfold over 
time” (Peng, Ahlstrom, Carraher, & Shi, 2017, emphasis in original) and theorize institutional 
instability and dynamics in IB contexts rather than contexts of stability (Kostova & Hult, 2016). 
Subsidiaries disseminate and institutionalize global practices locally by seizing emerging situations 
and prompting new ones, hence navigating from one situation to the next and making decisions 
about the most appropriate way to define themselves in each situation. This is far from being a ‘one-
size-fits-all’ process, and our findings demonstrate how one particular subsidiary created its own 
ways to transfer global practices into an institutionally distant environment. As has recently been 
shown in the case of Uber’s expansion into new American cities (Spicer, Eidelman, & Zwick, 2019), 
 
 30 
MNEs do not expand within a unified institutional framework. Each local, regional, or national 
government can issue their own laws and regulations, which means that different MNE subsidiaries 
face different situations. Their capacity to adjust their self-categorization tactics to local specificities, 
and to change their tactics as new institutional situations come along and new global strategic 
orientations are decided upon is paramount to their survival. 
6 Generalizability, future research and concluding remarks 
Although, as the example of Uber shows, our findings are relevant to other firms and 
contexts, generalization must be carried out with caution. The context dependence of our study is 
one limitation, as it is with most international business research based on a single case. Contexts are 
particularly essential in the case of nonmarket elements (Cui, Hu, Li, & Meyer, 2018; Doh, et al., 
2012; Rajwani & Liedong, 2015). Our findings can, however, foster generalization to similar, online 
platform-based businesses, and invite future IB research to investigate the nexus of online and 
nonmarket strategies. Online platforms are by nature impacted by the liability of ‘foreignness’ to a 
lesser extent than other businesses (Brouthers, et al., 2016), and Internet as a technology tends to 
promote free enterprise and deregulation (Kenney, 2003; Kogut, 2003), which may be at odds with 
established national institutions. Future research on the topic could investigate further how online 
platforms can develop nonmarket (dynamic) capabilities to promote their liberal approach to 
business globally while also abiding by their host governments’ legal and regulatory traditions. In 
particular, future studies could elaborate further on the necessity for platform managers to define 
their business model in a way that is meaningful not only to potential users, but also to institutional 
authorities. Additionally, by using a longitudinal case study focusing on France, we propose a 
somewhat uncommon empirical and methodological subject in the IB field. While an increasing 
proportion of research in IB focuses on emerging economies and uses large databases, ours invites 
further historical case studies that look at the intricacies and peculiarities of European markets from 
a nonmarket strategy perspective. This is a particularly pressing issue, as individual European 
countries still rely on different legal systems, despite European harmonization. Attempts at 
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harmonizing laws in the region may come under further strain, depending on the outcome of the 
Brexit process. 
Moving beyond the empirical phenomenon to more analytical generalization (Yin, 2018), our 
research is an invitation to rebalance the institution-based view of international strategy in favor of a 
greater focus on formal institutions. Formal institutions have often been neglected, due to the 
conviction that “the regulatory domain is perhaps the easiest to observe, understand, and interpret 
correctly because it is formalized in laws, rules, and regulations” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, p. 70). 
Our findings show that the line between formal and informal institutions is not clear cut, confirming 
the argument that the meaning of laws and regulations is shaped not only by regulators, but also by 
business professionals in an interactive and ongoing framing of regulatory problems and solutions 
(Gilad, 2014; Talesh, 2015). More research is needed on how MNEs shape their level of compliance 
with local laws and regulations, and how they can influence formal regulatory frameworks through 
rhetoric and narratives. Additionally, our findings invite further studies on self-categorization as a 
nonmarket strategy. MNE subsidiaries play the role of spanning the boundaries between their global 
head offices and their local environment. Through categories, they create a fit between their 
organizational practices and the institutional constraints in their host country. Our findings can be 
generalized to firms internationalizing in countries that do not have the institutions to regulate their 
activities, which is generally the case with technology-based firms exporting a new product or 
service. Future research could investigate further how innovative MNEs choose between borrowing 
existing labels and inventing new ones to categorize their activities and create a fit with their 
institutional environment. More broadly, our research invites IB scholars to study the ‘language’ of 
nonmarket strategies, as MNE subsidiaries use labels, rhetoric, and narratives as means of action. 
We hope that this study will fuel future international business research on the important topic of 
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Figure 3 – A theoretical model of MNE subsidiaries’ self-categorization process as a nonmarket 
strategy 
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Appendix A – Data collection 
ARCHIVAL DATA INTERVIEW DATA 
 
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ON GOVERNMENTAL WEBSITES 
- foruminternet.org (Forum on Internet Rights) 
- pme.gouv.fr  (State Secretary for SMEs and Commerce) 
- legifrance.gouv.fr (governmental archival website for legal texts) 
- apce.com (governmental agency for business creation) 
- lautoentrepreneur.fr (auto-entrepreneur/Novelli Law website) 
- senat.fr (Senate Chamber) 
 
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS ON INFORMATION WEBSITES 
-legipme.com (legal information website for SMEs) 
- legalis.net (information website on legal matters) 
- journaldunet.fr (main information website about the development of Internet 
in France) 
- lesechos.fr/Les Echos (main French business and economic newspaper) 
- latribune.fr/La Tribune (French business and economic newspaper) 
- lexpansion.lexpress.fr/L’Expansion (main French business and economic 
magazine) 
- news.bbc.co.uk (BBC) 
- ft.com (Financial Times) 
- lemondeinformatique.fr (supplement to Le Monde newspaper, focusing on 
Internet matters) 
- zdnet.fr (information website about Internet matters) 
 
 
INTERNAL PUBLIC DOCUMENTS: 
- actualites.ebay.fr (news and archived news on eBay France, 2006-2010) 
- eBay annual reports 2004-2010 
- fevad.com (website of the national trade association of Internet businesses) 
 
 
INTERNAL EBAY PRIVATE DOCUMENTS: 
- internal reports 
- Nielsen reports 
- brochures and instructions/guide documents for sellers 
 
 
CONFIRMATORY INTERVIEWS  
 
Managers at eBay France 
- P.W., Business Seller Segment Manager 
- F.F.C., Business Seller Segment 
Manager 
- T.S., Sellers Managing Director 
- B.D., Chief Legal Officer at eBay France 
2001-2006 
- E.G., Chief Legal Officer at eBay France 
2007-2010  
- A.V.S., Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
eBay France until 2010 
 
Representatives of the government 
- B. Tabaka, Convenor of the subgroup of 
the Forum on Internet Rights on tax 
evasion in 2005-2006 
- R. Dutreil, Ministry of Small and Medium 
Sized Firms in 2006, signatory of the 2006 
Confidence Charter 
- H. Novelli, Secretary of State for Small 
and Medium Sized Firms in 2008, 
originator of the 2008 Law for the 
Modernization of the Economy 
 
Manager at PriceMinister, eBay’s main 
competitor 
- P. Kosciusko Morizet, General Manager 
during the whole period 






Appendix B – Examples of interview questions 
General questions 
 Would you say that French regulations were originally a constraint or an opportunity for eBay 
– and for e-commerce firms in general? 
 When have you been personally involved in interactions, discussions with regulatory 
authorities?  
 Considering the different texts in which eBay was involved, would you say that eBay generally 
coordinated with other actors, such as PriceMinister, Amazon, or was eBay mostly 
independent in their discussions with the government? 
 Did eBay coordinate with the Fevad? When? 
Questions on the Forum on Internet Rights 
 Who was at the origin of the working group about e-marketplaces?  
 Why did eBay take part to this working group? 
 What was the position of eBay during the discussions (on the threshold / on legal status of 
Internet platforms)? Did eBay try to defend some particular ideas?  
 Do you think the discussions contributed favorably to eBay’s interests? 
Questions on the Dutreil Charter 
 Who was at the origin of the charter?  
 What was the role of eBay in this charter?  
 Why did eBay get involved? 
Questions on lawsuits 
 Why did eBay get involved in lawsuits against the CVV / luxury manufacturers?  
 What were the main arguments eBay used during the lawsuits? 
Questions on the Marini bill 
 Why did eBay oppose this bill?  
 Why did you sign a petition with your competitor PriceMinister?  
 Have you met Mr Marini?  
 What were the main arguments eBay developed against the bill? 
Questions on the Chatel law 
 What was the position of eBay in the Chatel law?  
 Why was it different from the position of the Fevad?  
 What role did eBay play in this law?  
Questions on the Novelli law  
 What role did eBay play in the Novelli law?  
 Was a new legal environment for entrepreneurship something that eBay wanted? Why?  
 Have you met Mr Novelli or his team, and what sort of message have you delivered to him?  
 
